The US claims that China’s internet controls may violate the rules of global trade. This line of argument exposes a dilemma for China’s leaders who struggle to uphold an increasingly authoritarian system in an era of deepening international Integration.
Interview with Yuen-ying Chan
Media freedom in China has suffered under president Xi Jinping, and Professor Yuen-ying Chan agrees that these are hard times for Chinese journalists. In our MERICS Podcast, the director of the Journalism and Media Studies Centre at Hongkong University also argues that independent journalism in China still exists.
China's grand plan to become a football superpower are in line with a long list of ambitions to become No. 1 in the world - and its leaders are likely to pursue it with the same Determination.
As rising tensions in the South China Sea worry policymakers from Washington to Brussels, the US and the EU should seize the opportunity to cooperate with China in another part of the world. China’s growing role in the Mideast and its “One Belt, One Road” initiative could be a starting point for non-traditional maritime security cooperation.
Rolf J. Langhammer
A few years ago, Western countries feared that China’s forays into Africa would cut them off from commodities. In light of current low prices it looks as if China made a mistake when it secured access to resources through risky Investments.
The revelation that his brother-in-law used offshore tax havens to hide his wealth is more than an embarrassment for China’s president Xi Jinping. His anti-corruption campaign will only have domestic credibility once family members of the party leaders can be subjected to investigations.
Tensions in the South China Sea may escalate when an international tribunal rules on China’s maritime claims. Europe may feel far removed from the conflict, but European involvement and transatlantic coordination could be instrumental in defusing the dangerous Situation.
China’s leaders deeply believe in digital solutions to meet the country’s challenges – and they don’t leave their development up to the private sector. In part 4 of our series on the 13th five-year plan, Mirjam Meissner describes their highly innovative plans to spur new economic growth – and to strengthen social Control.
In Part 3 of our series on the 13th five-year plan, Jessica Batke shows how the CCP hopes to foster a sense of national identity by instilling cultural and moral values among the population. A key part of this constructed identity is closeness with the Party itself.
In Part 2 of our series on the 13th five-year plan, Sandra Heep explains why China’s ambitious growth target will exacerbate many of the country’s economic problems. She argues that the looser monetary and fiscal policy necessary to reach this goal will put depreciation pressure on the renminbi, inflate asset prices and increase China’s debt burden.
Five-year plans in the PR China are more than a relic of the Mao era. Rather than stipulating industrial output in a planned economy, today’s plans serve as roadmaps for China’s future. The MERICS team took a closer look at the recently adopted 13th five-year plan. In the first part of our series, Lea Shih presents ten of the biggest changes from the previous plan.
China seems to have shelved its controversial draft law on foreign NGOs, at least for now. Rather than cracking down on Western civil society organisations in China, a new charity law increases the scope for domestic philanthropy. The strategy seems to align with the ‘Made in China 2025’ technology roadmap: the goal is to build up Chinese champions who can compete against Western organisations.
Is the crack down on one of Hong Kong’s top newspapers a result of China’s stricter media policy or retaliation for a specific article? Or is it meant to boost the paper’s credibility as an independent news source before the impending takeover by Alibaba?
The recent increase of the EU’s steel imports from China is not a harbinger of China flooding European markets with its industrial overcapacities. The steel industry is suffering from global overcapacities, not just China’s. Fears of a disruptive surge of Chinese imports in other industries currently seem overblown.
China's top entrepreneurs have stepped up their game to influence the country's political agenda. This year's National People's Congress provides evidence of that.
Rather than presiding over another round of double-digit growth in China’s military budget, President Xi Jinping wants to turn the world’s largest military into a truly modern armed force.
Like his predecessors, Xi Jinping has coined political terms to display visionary leadership. The evolution of these phrases provides a window into how political concepts are formed within the Party and how they are tested among the Public.
Like many other fragments of information that trickle out of the black box of China’s leadership, the new usage of the term “hexin” could mean several different—opposing—things.
China has a huge stake in a peaceful transformation of North Korea, but it has so far shown little inclination to do something about it. Is this about to Change?
Rolf J. Langhammer
Accepting its trading partner China as a market economy does not need to be a bad deal for the EU. The costs of Chinese dumping to the European economy are often overestimated. And levelling the playing field may even incentivise Chinese companies to be more transparent in calculating costs and Prices.
The economic and political costs of granting Market Economy Status (MES) to Beijing without extracting concessions in return would be too high. In addition to economic interests, political and strategic considerations should also guide the EU’s decision.
China’s articulation of a vision of international order may be in its early stages. But some central elements are out – time for Europe and the US to start working on an answer.
Prospects for crisis resolution in the Asia-Pacific are better than between Russia and the West. Despite abundant conflicts, none of the major powers in the region tries to actively destabilise the other – leaving room for informal compromise and ad-hoc arrangements to maintain peace.
China did not feature prominently at this year’s MSC. But the participation of Fu Ying, Chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, in a panel discussion moderated by MERICS director Sebastian Heilmann made clear: China is willing to get involved, albeit hesitantly and according to its own rules.
The Munich Security Conference so far mainly provides an opportunity to talk about China, but not with China. Europeans need to improve the channels to engage Asia and China in security dialogues.