Li Hui’s Europe tour 2.0 + Beijing’s mediation as seen from Kyiv + Market distortions

In this issue of MERICS Europe China 360°, we cover the following topics:

• Li Hui’s Europe tour 2.0: Shuttle diplomacy for pro-Russian peace
• Prospects for Beijing’s mediation as seen from Kyiv
• The EU ramps up action against China’s market distortions

Li Hui’s Europe tour 2.0: Shuttle diplomacy for pro-Russian peace

By Grzegorz Stec 

Between March 2 and 11 Li Hui, China's Special Representative on Eurasian Affairs, was back in Europe for round two of shuttle diplomacy aimed officially to “mediate and build consensus” to end the “Ukraine crisis” – Beijing’s euphemism for Russia’s invasion. 

In many ways it is déjà vu. In May last year Li toured the same destinations, albeit in a different order, promoting a then recently released position paper from China on the “Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” (often incorrectly referred to as peace plan).

This round of Li Hui’s shuttle diplomacy was about strengthening China’s position and probing the EU’s resolve to find space for a peace formula that would accommodate Russia’s demands – all the while work proceeds for the Swiss-hosted international peace conference in the summer.

Not looking for solutions

The timing and readouts of the visit show that Beijing is not looking to build positive momentum with the EU.

Li’s tour came just two weeks after the EU unveiled its 13th package of sanctions, including against three mainland Chinese companies over their exports of sensitive tech to Russia. While the sanctions only effectively restrict the cooperation of those companies with European entities, targeting companies in mainland China is a significant political gesture and a line that the EU had thus far not crossed.

In direct response, Beijing claimed the EU’s move “violates the consensus and spirit of the China-EU leaders' meeting.” And Li’s exchange with EU officials revealed he was not sent to find solutions but only to rebuke the EU’s actions. The usually upbeat Chinese readouts instead highlighted “China's stern position of firmly opposing the EU's unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction.”

For context, this move hardly came out of the blue. It followed two distinct events: first the sanctioning of Hong Kong based entities in June last year; and then a clear December communique to China’s leadership at the EU-China summit of intent for further actions should Beijing not take steps to ensure its companies respect EU sanctions on Russia.

Looking for cracks

In light of the impact of US representatives’ waning support for Ukraine, and disagreements over modalities of supporting Ukraine between European capitals, Li’s mission appeared more like a scouting mission for signs of “Ukraine fatigue” among European actors than one seeking consensus. On the sidelines of the National People’s Congress, Wang Yi himself stated that the February Munich Security Conference showed that “more and more people begin to worry about a possible lose-lose outcome, they are ready to create conditions to explore a reliable way out of this crisis.”

And by that, Beijing means moving beyond Zelensky’s conditions for peace – a full withdrawal of Russian troops and restitution of Ukraine’s full territorial integrity. Instead, China’s leadership pushes for “the equal participation of all parties and fair discussions on all peace plans,” opening doors to the question of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.